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Using a sample of 762 international M&As, we find a positive effect of ESG performance
on deal premia. We find that resource use, human rights, and management are the most
important categories of ESG. These aspects might be more quantifiable and relevant,
making them easier to value in a transaction and more attractive to the acquirer. Targets
receive higher premiums from raising their resource use score by one standard deviation,
compared to raising the total ESG score by one standard deviation, suggesting that targets
are better off focusing on this category for raising premiums.
Furthermore, we find that the effect of ESG performance on deal premiums diminishes
when the target is in the upper tercile of analyst following and in deals with share payments.
This finding supports extant research in that ESG reduces information asymmetries and
facilitates risk mitigation. Since we find a positive relationship between premia and ESG
scores, we argue that ESG initiatives are valuable. ESG affects synergies, information
asymmetries, and risk mitigation, supporting the stakeholder view of ESG in that ESG is
valuable. Our results are largely robust to correcting for potential endogeneity issues and
other robustness tests.
We also find that targets and acquirers improve their score by about five and seven
points, respectively, when merging with a higher-scored firm. Such a substantial score
improvement suggests that the transfer of ESG-related capabilities such as knowledge,
culture, reputation, and relationships with stakeholders is possible, as previous literature
suggests. This finding leads us to argue that merging to attain better ESG performance
might potentially be a contributing motive for M&A itself.
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1 Introduction
This thesis will investigate environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) scores of targets’
and acquirers’ effect on mergers & acquisitions (“M&A”) deal premiums. We gather
transactions from the last 15 years since data on ESG scores have become widely available
recently. Matching ESG-score to the deal announcement year yields a sample of 766
transactions. We will first employ multiple regression to explore the effect of ESG score
on deal premiums.
To better understand which specific aspects of ESG influence premia, we run the same
regression models on category scores, which are ten categories that combined make up
the total score. Additionally, we explore whether contexts where information asymmetry
or risk mitigation is more or less prevalent enhance or diminish the effect of ESG on
premiums, based on theoretical mechanisms identified in the literature review. These
aspects are scarcely researched: Extant work focuses mainly on the overall score, finding
a positive effect on premia. Then, we will investigate whether the ESG score of the
transaction parties improves from before the merger to after it. To our knowledge, such
research has not been done before.
Since entering into M&As and receiving an ESG score are non-random events, the risk
of a selection bias and other biases induced by omitted variables is present. We address
these endogeneity concerns by employing a two-stage Heckman correction model and
instrumental variable regression.
We research M&A deal premiums specifically as this offers some key advantages: First,
potential bidders perform due diligence, making them more informed about intrinsic value
than the market. Secondly, they better understand intangible assets, specifically those
related to ESG in our context. Thus, acquirers are more likely to value ESG performance
and -synergies correctly than marginal investors. Additionally, scoring firms based on
their ESG initiatives quantifies a largely qualitative aspect of a firm. Combining these
points allows us to research whether acquirers value good ESG performance.
M&A bidders are more concerned about the target’s specific risks because of investment
concentration and costs of potential divestiture. Good ESG performance may alleviate
this risk since good relationships with stakeholders build goodwill, reducing the negative
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consequences of cash-flow shocks (Godfrey et al., 2009). Theoretically, this should increase
the importance acquirers place on ESG in the context of M&A, at least when we factor
in that ESG might also reduce information asymmetries. Extant research discuss these
advantages of ESG, but our thesis seeks to investigate them empirically.
We also attempt to introduce more standardized measures of ESG performance since much
of extant research employs proxies for such performance (Godfrey et al., 2009). Hence,
our approach is more replicable and transferable to specific regions, different periods, and
the like.
Our thesis is structured as follows: First, we review the literature on ESG and value,
M&A and ESG performance, and factors affecting deal premiums and ESG. Drawing from
this, we formulate our hypotheses in the following section. Then, we describe our data
and sample collection process. After, we describe all the variables’ implementation before
outlining our methodology. We present our findings in the results section before exploring
the robustness behind them and the limitations of our research. Lastly, we conclude based
on our original hypotheses, findings, and discussion.
3
2 Literature Review
In this section, we first review the relationship between ESG and value. Next, we discuss
ESG performance in light of M&As and the motives behind them, as these motives
broadly cover the sources of deal premia. From this, we discuss benefits of increased ESG
performance - reduced information asymmetries and risk mitigation - in greater detail.
The third section builds upon the first two: It outlines which factors impact premiums
and ESG performance. Most studies find a positive relationship between CSR1 and deal
premia (Choi et al., 2015; Gomes & Marsat, 2018; Malik, 2014).
2.1 ESG and Value
The shareholder expense view put forth by Friedman (2007) argues that firms’ only
social responsibility should be their shareholders. Thus, firms should maximize profits
and shareholder value. According to this view, the costs of ESG initiatives, which
benefit stakeholders and society, do not translate into better financial performance. The
stakeholder view takes the opposite stance, arguing that good ESG performance and profit
are not mutually exclusive (Freeman, 2010; Porter & Kramer, 2006). ESG initiatives may
create a competitive advantage, which can raise profits. Such competitive advantages
include reputation, culture, and knowledge, which we refer to as ESG capabilities. For
example, a good reputation might increase a firm’s customer base, providing the firm
with increased sales. As such, the two views reach opposite conclusions regarding the
valuation of ESG. Attempts to empirically investigate which one prevails have not reached
a consensus2. The main reason is because of the intangible nature of ESG initiatives,
making them hard to value3 (Gomes & Marsat, 2018). Theoretically, such intangible assets
are valuable if they are a source of competitive advantage, following the resource-based
view of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984).
1Extant work focuses mainly on CSR, as opposed to ESG. However, since CSR is often calculated
using the environmental and social scores or similar, the findings should be relevant in our context as well.
2See e.g., Servaes and Tamayo (2013); Gregory et al. (2014); Aouadi and Marsat (2016).
3The context of M&As potentially makes these valuations more accurate, which is why we research
them specifically.
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2.2 M&A and ESG Performance
Two of the most prevalent motives for M&A in the literature are the synergy hypothesis
and the market for corporate control hypothesis. In this section, we detail the motives
before explaining how they relate to ESG. The theoretical effect of ESG on premia is
ambiguous, although many of the papers reviewed find a positive link.
The synergy hypothesis states that managers capture value for shareholders through
different synergies (Malik, 2014; Lubatkin, 1987; Capron & Pistre, 2002). The literature
identifies synergies associated with efficiency-related gains such as economies of vertical
integration, scope and scale, and financial gains, e.g., diversification and product market
synergies (Motis, 2007). These expected synergies should be reflected in the acquisition
premium (Díaz et al., 2013).
Synergies might be enhanced or created from good ESG performance. An example of this
is if a company prioritizes innovation, creating new products, services, production methods,
or exposure to new markets4. This capability should be valuable to acquirers, which would
then pay a higher premium for such firms. Moreover, compatibility of views on cultural,
ethical, and governance-related matters are material determinants of successful synergy
realization and integration (Ficery et al., 2007; Appelbaum, 2009). Therefore, ESG may
be an indicator of compatibility between the target and the acquirer (Deng et al., 2013),
increasing the likelihood of realizing synergies.
Supporting the previous argument, Aktas et al. (2011) find that more synergistic deals
occur with targets that exhibit better CSR performance. In addition, if acquirers can
transfer CSR capabilities to the target or vice versa, synergies may be created from this
transfer. Indeed, Aktas et al. also uncover that the CSR performance of an acquirer
increases after acquiring an SRI (socially responsible investment) aware target. Malik
(2014) also finds these learning effects, in which the effect of the target’s CSR score on
deal premiums was higher in deals involving high-CSR acquirers. She highlights the
greater value-enhancing and synergistic capabilities of targets with superior CSR quality
as reasons for the positive effect. Thus, good ESG performance might enhance or create
synergies in M&As, positively impacting the deal premium.
4Innovation and product responsibility are categories within the total ESG score.
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Next, the disciplinary effect of the equity market on underperforming managers is referred
to as the market for corporate control hypothesis (Manne, 1965). The hypothesis states
that inefficient management manifests in the stock price of the company. Potential
acquirers can detect this, acquire the company and replace the management. Therefore,
managers who either act outside the best interest of shareholders or are incompetent
gets replaced, increasing the target’s value (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Relating this to
premia, this is the value of control or control premium, i.e., the gain from managing the
target more efficiently (Damodaran, 2005). Thus, following the market for corporate
control hypothesis, we expect the deal premium to be higher when the target has poor
management.
Since this hypothesis concerns management and governance mechanisms, it should be
related to ESG since ESG explicitly measures governance performance. Indeed, one of the
components of the governance score is management. The hypothesis then suggests that
firms with low management scores should be more frequently acquired and receive higher
premia. In addition, if social and environmental responsibility is unachievable without
destroying shareholder value5, high ESG performers should be more frequent takeover
targets due to inefficient management, according to the hypothesis (Manne, 1965). The
deal premium should then be higher for these firms because of the value of control. On
the other hand, competent managers may be a valuable asset to acquirers according to
the stakeholder view, so the relationship between ESG performance and the hypothesis is
ambiguous.
2.2.1 Asymmetric Information
In MAs, there will exist some form of asymmetric information between the parties of a
merger because it is hard for acquirers to observe all aspects of their potential targets.
There is incomplete information since the seller has more comprehensive knowledge of his
firm. Thus, asymmetric information is closely related to premiums because the intrinsic
value is harder to observe when information is scarce. Roychowdhury et al. (2019) find
that disclosure might resolve information asymmetries, mitigating adverse selection.
Regarding adverse selection, potential bidders may find that acquiring information about
5Consistent with the shareholder expense view.
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targets is too costly, making it challenging to determine their quality. Likewise, targets
have the incentive to misrepresent their quality to obtain higher premiums (Reuer &
Ragozzino, 2008). These consequences can lead to the abandonment of potential deals,
discounted offer prices, and the risk of adverse selection borne by the bidder. Thus,
acquirers will have incentives to treat all potential targets as bad6. Therefore, the risk of
adverse selection will most likely impact premia since the bidder is less informed on the
actual quality of the target. Because of this, good targets have an incentive to disclose
more to signal their overall quality.
ESG reporting might reduce some of this information asymmetry through transparency
about ESG initiatives (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). As ESG scores incorporate both
performance and disclosure related to ESG, a higher score may be related to higher
premiums. A positive relationship between CSR and acquisition premiums may be
attributed to the acquirer valuing CSR involvement in itself, as well as reduced information
asymmetries (Gomes & Marsat, 2018). Specifically, CSR reduces asymmetries and adverse
selection since CSR performance signals the overall quality of the target, along with
cultural and ethical values (Choi et al., 2015). In an environment with adverse selection,
it is intuitive that such signaling increases premia.
In addition, the effect of CSR on acquisition premiums may be even more prevalent in
low-information environments (Choi et al., 2015), such as during cross-border M&As. In
these deals, the information asymmetry is usually more significant due to, e.g., differing
disclosure requirements, regulation, and culture (Gomes & Marsat, 2018). These findings
emphasize that ESG may be an important determinant of deal premiums by reducing
information asymmetry and adverse selection.
On the other hand, the degree of information asymmetry is related to the risk of
overpayment (Datar et al., 2001). Then, due to the multifarious nature of ESG scores7,
and if both high- and low-quality targets are inclined to disclose ESG information, the
effect is ambiguous. For example, acquirers can better uncover negative ESG-related
behaviors of the firm, e.g., poor working conditions, which contradict the stakeholder view
of ESG, in this case lowering the premium. Chen & Gavious (2015) argue that acquirers
have a superior ability to gain information rather than marginal investors, for example,
6I.e., the lemons problem, proposed by Akerlof (1978).
7As in incorporating both ESG performance as well as disclosure into scores.
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private individuals. Further, they assert that acquirers do not view ESG as having a real
profit potential for the firm because it does not reveal additional information.
2.2.2 Risk Mitigation
ESG activities may act as insurance: Godfrey et al. (2009) find that CSR engagement
benefits the firm in the case of a negative shock, where the loss of value on average was
less severe for firms with good CSR performance. The insurance effect results from the
goodwill created from CSR initiatives directed towards stakeholders, essentially allowing
the firm to mitigate its risk through good relationships.
Consistent with the stakeholder view, CSR may function as a reputational asset that
indirectly represents the target firm’s relationship with its stakeholders (Choi et al., 2015).
Thus, acquirers may associate CSR performance with lower specific risk. CSR engagement
also lowers the probability of reputational and litigation risks resulting from social and
environmental issues, such as human rights violations or emission scandals, which acquirers
may value more than marginal investors because of investment concentration: As the cost
of liquidation and risk reduction is higher for acquirers (Malik, 2014), acquirers should
positively value these risk-mitigating effects of ESG, leading to higher premia.
To sum up, the factors discussed should, in theory, influence premiums. While the impact
of ESG on premia is ambiguous8, most of the papers reviewed find a positive effect. Any
misvaluation of ESG activities may stem from a lack of understanding of the consequences
of such initiatives (Malik, 2014). If market participants undervalue firms with high
ESG scores, we may see a positive effect of ESG on premiums through its effect on risk
management, information asymmetries, and synergies. However, whether this stems from
good ESG performance directly or the increased level of disclosure good ESG scores imply
is not certain.
2.3 Factors Affecting Premiums and ESG
This section will detail factors affecting premia that might theoretically be linked to
ESG and deal premiums, warranting their inclusion as control variables. Table A1 in the
appendix synthesizes the expected sign of each variable, along with the applicable motive
8Which is why empirical research is warranted.
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for M&A or proxy. We discuss variables relating to synergies, information asymmetries,
or risk mitigation separately, drawing on the discussion above to establish a relationship
with ESG.
We first discuss synergies. Size proxies for the effect of increased complexity, potentially
making synergies harder to realize (Alexandridis et al., 2013). Complexity is also related
to information asymmetries, making size related to ESG. Further, industry-related deals
are associated with lower information asymmetries because the market knowledge of the
acquirer is relatively better (Gomes & Marsat, 2018). In these deals synergies may be
easier to realize (Mercer, 1999; Shelton, 1988), making the effect on premia and ESG
ambiguous. Regarding capital expenditures, Gomes & Marsat find that these influence
synergies; for example, higher capex might increase the potential for cost-cutting by
removing duplicate investments.
Targets with low growth might be desirable because of realizable gains if current
management gets replaced (Dionne et al., 2015), consistent with the market for corporate
control hypothesis. Thus, potential gains are larger when management performs poorly
(Manne, 1965), and ESG might enhance the effect (Aktas et al., 2011), as discussed above.
Considering information asymmetries, cross-border deals are associated with increased
asymmetries arising from cultural differences, accounting standards, and regulation
(Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). However, shareholder gains from cultural input may
increase to the benefit of both parties (Danbolt & Maciver, 2012). Thus, the link to
ESG is evident, while the effect on premia is ambiguous. Furthermore, competition is
more likely when information about the target is accessible (Jennings & Mazzeo, 1993).
Thus, it is linked with ESG, and most research finds a positive relationship with premia
(Varaiya, 1987; Fidrmuc, 2013). From Jennings & Mazzeo (1993), we infer that hostile
deals have a higher availability of information9, implying that information asymmetries
are less prevalent or severe in hostile deals. Thus, ESG performance might matter less in
hostile takeovers. Most scholars find a positive effect on premia (Burch, 2001; Bates &
Lemmon, 2003).
Blockholds proxy for reduced information asymmetries (Dionne et al., 2015) since acquirers
9Since they find that hostile deals correlate with competition, and competition correlates with
availability of information.
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can observe and monitor the target. Monitoring also allows them to mitigate mispricing risk,
which reduces premiums (Walkling & Edmister, 1985). Martin (1996) also mentions that
blockholders can roll back antitakeover defenses, relating blockholds to governance. Thus,
blockholds may diminish the effect of ESG on premia. Next, financial analysts perform due
diligence on firms, potentially uncovering more information, reducing asymmetries. These
analysts are more accurate when firms disclose more ESG-related information (Cormier &
Magnan, 2014).
Lastly, we will discuss risk mitigation. Cash payments are associated with higher confidence
in post-merger success relative to share payments (Linn & Switzer, 2001), which may
positively affect premiums (de La Bruslerie, 2013). Taxes are deferred in stock-financed
transactions10, potentially creating an advantageous effect compared to cash financing
(Ayers et al., 2003). Hansen (1987) introduced risk-sharing, reflecting the relationship
between payment methods and the double informational asymmetries between the parties.
Share payments are also associated with risk-sharing since the target receives shares
instead of risk-free cash, raising premiums. When receiving shares in the merged firm, the
seller’s payoff is conditional on its performance and successful integration. Additionally,
the choice of payment might signal whether acquirers perceive their shares as over- or
undervalued (Faccio & Masulis, 2005). Since the choice of payment method reflects both
risk mitigation and asymmetric information, its link with ESG is clear.
The market to book ratio reflects a firm’s future growth potential (Martin, 1996) and
proxies for misvaluation (Dong et al., 2006). Both these effects align the ratio with risk,
but the effect on premia is ambiguous (Officer, 2003; Walkling & Edmister, 1985). Further,
the ratio reflects managerial discipline and discretion since it measures managers’ ability
to create value from existing assets. Extant research promoting the stakeholder view has
pointed out how a firm’s ESG initiatives can be viewed as intangible assets because they
can create value, creating a theoretical link between them. Next, a highly levered target is
considered less attractive11 and may receive lower premiums (Dionne et al., 2015). With
highly levered targets, the acquirer is relatively more likely to pay using shares to limit
the effect on its leverage. Because of the risk-sharing effects of share financing (Hansen,
1987) and because stricter monitoring by debtors might reveal more information (de La
10Depending on the country of domicile.
11E.g., because of higher interest rates and more constrained financing options.
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Bruslerie, 2013), leverage is potentially related to ESG. This research also finds that
leverage affects premia negatively.
Since these aforementioned characteristics vary over time and for different industries
(Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996), they might affect premia
differently (Bennett & Dam, 2017). Thus, controlling for time- and industry fixed effects
is also relevant in our study.
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3 Hypotheses
3.1 Hypothesis 1: ESG-score Affects M&A premiums positively.
From the review in the previous section, we gather that relevant literature mainly focuses on
CSR but still finds a significantly positive relationship with premiums. However, according
to the literature discussed earlier, the relationship is ambiguous, clearly justifying further
empirical research. Thus, our first hypothesis is that ESG-scores affect deal premiums
positively because of its effect on information asymmetries, risk mitigation, and synergies
(Gomes & Marsat, 2018; Malik, 2014; Aktas et al., 2011).
When inspecting the categories within each pillar that combined make up the ESG score,
multiple aspects might affect premiums either positively or negatively. For example, a
relatively low emission target might command higher premiums; and a target with a high
workforce score might have more efficient and motivated workers, raising premiums.
We will investigate the main results further by disaggregating the combined score, looking
at individual category scores. The latter is particularly interesting since extant research
has made few efforts to investigate this, despite citing it as an exciting avenue for future
research12.
3.2 Hypothesis 2a: The effect of ESG on premia is stronger in
context with higher asymmetric information and vice versa.
Through our discussion in the literature review, we have established theoretical connections
between ESG and asymmetric information. To better investigate how and why ESG
impacts deal premiums, we examine the effect in different informational contexts. We
hypothesize that ESG is more important in contexts where information asymmetry is
higher, and vice versa, as suggested by extant literature (e.g., Choi et al., 2015; Gomes
& Marsat, 2018). The rationale is that when information asymmetry is low, marginal
reductions in information asymmetry from ESG should be less valuable, and vice versa.
To investigate this hypothesis, we look at whether the effect of the target’s ESG score
is higher in cross-border deals (i.e., deals with higher levels of information asymmetry),
12See e.g. Gomes & Marsat (2018)
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same-industry deals, and deals where the target is highly followed by analysts (deals with
lower levels of asymmetry).
3.3 Hypothesis 2b: The effect of ESG on premia is lower in deals
with share payments.
In this hypothesis, we investigate whether the ESG effect on premia is lower when the
acquirer uses share payments, as the payment method may reveal details about the
perceived risk and confidence in the deal (Linn & Switzer, 2001; Officer et al., 2009).
The payment method also relates to risk-sharing – in share payments, acquirers transfer
some of their risk to the target. Thus, share payments may mitigate adverse selection
- if targets know that their assets are of high value, they can also anticipate that their
holdings in the merged enterprise will increase, making them more likely to accept share
payments (Hansen, 1987). Risk-sharing is relevant due to the risk-mitigating properties
of CSR engagement (Godfrey et al., 2009) and CSR as a reputational asset (Choi et al.,
2015). Therefore, we hypothesize that the effect of the target’s score on premia is reduced
when risk-mitigation efforts are made through share payments.
3.4 Hypothesis 3: Deal participants improve their ESG score
post-acquisition if merging with a higher-scored firm.
Our third hypothesis is based on the synergy hypothesis and how it relates to ESG. We
examine if synergies can be created by transferring ESG capabilities from target to acquirer,
or vice versa. If so, we should notice an increase in score from the announcement year to
post-acquisition. If the previous point holds, merging to attain better ESG capabilities
can be viewed as a motive for M&A itself.
This point is supported by Berchicci et al. (2012), who find that acquirers with poor
CSR performance acquiring targets with high CSR performance can distribute these
capabilities and benefits to themselves. Aktas et al. (2011) attribute this to a “learning
effect,” i.e., the acquirer learning from its target. Given the opposite case, where the
acquirer has a high score and the target has a low score, an acquirer might purposefully
look for targets that can benefit the most from the transfer of ESG capabilities (Berchicci
et al. 2012). As such, we can also investigate whether targets purchased by firms with
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high ESG performance improve more than their peers.
We will investigate whether targets or acquirers improve their score relatively more when
merging with an acquirer or target with a higher score than deals with a smaller score
differential. We hypothesize that the deal participants improve their score more when the
differential is larger.
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4 Data and Sample Construction
We collect ESG scores and financial data from Refinitiv Eikon, while the M&A data is
from the Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company Platinum database (“SDC”) available
within Refinitiv Eikon. We will first describe the SDC database, our choice of ESG data
provider, and ESG scores in greater detail before describing the sample collection and
creation process.
4.1 Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum
The SDC Platinum database contains 1.1 million M&As since the 1970s. It allows users to
filter the M&A universe based on a range of criteria, such as year, country, size, industry,
deal status, and deal type, to mention a few. These filters apply to targets, acquirers, or
the deal.
In addition, it allows users to add more information to the individual deal by including
additional variables. These might relate to the specific deal, such as whether the deal was
hostile or how the acquirer financed it. Users may also include other types of variables such
as financial metrics and ratios. Applying these filters and attaching additional information
yields a custom sample of M&As, which can then be analyzed further.
4.2 Choice of ESG data provider
Scoring is ambiguous: Chatterji et al. (2009) find that scores inaccurately reflect the
actual level of compliance and public information available. This misrepresentation implies
that measuring the qualitative aspect of ESG initiatives leaves substantial room for error.
An advantage of using scores from Refinitiv is that they address this issue by scoring firms
based on their peers instead of using an absolute score.
Studying the three major ESG score providers13, Dorfleitner et al. (2015) find no
convergence in scoring. This finding further illustrates the point above since providers
arrive at different results for the same firms. The providers have proprietary scoring
methodologies, which might explain some differences. These also decrease transparency
and make it hard to assess whether scores reflect reality or not. We use data from Refinitiv
13Refinitiv, Bloomberg, and MSCI.
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as their current and historical coverage is more extensive than most other providers.
Expanded coverage allows us to maximize our final sample size and minimize the influence
of ambiguous scoring.
4.3 Refinitiv ESG scores
Refinitiv’s ESG scores cover 70% of global market capitalization, with data dating back to
2002. Scores account for company size and transparency since firms are scored based on
rank. Refinitiv retrieves its data from annual reports, company websites, NGO websites,
stock exchange filings, CSR reports, and news sources (Refinitiv, 2021).
4.3.1 Scoring Methodology
Each of the three pillars is broken down further into categories. For the environmental
and social pillars, scoring is based on industry peers, while scoring in the governance pillar
is based on the country of incorporation. The latter is because governance practices are
more consistent across countries than industries. We retrieve the total score, pillar scores,
and category scores for each firm.
Each category within the three pillars and the pillars themselves receive weights according
to their relative importance. Weights vary based on industry or country. The percentile
rank score is calculated as follows:
Score =
No. of companies with a worse value+ No. of companies with the same value
2
No. of companies with a value
(4.1)
Relative scoring will impact how much different ESG initiatives are valued in scoring,
compared to using, e.g., an equal-weighted or absolute score. Thus, firms might increase
their score more by focusing on categories or pillars with poor peer performance. Scoring
based on percentile ranks results in a score from 0-100, minimizing the influence of outliers.
An additional advantage is that the score determines whether a company performs
relatively “good” or “bad” instead of the methodology or Refinitiv labeling companies as
one or the other. Thus, we regard the scoring methodology as relatively quantitatively
focused, which is advantageous since it is more objective and less biased.
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4.3.2 Disclosure and Transparency
Weighting increases the relative importance of data points. Furthermore, scoring is subject
primarily to a company’s disclosure, which is accounted for explicitly. Not reporting less
important data points does not affect score a lot, while not disclosing more material data
points is penalized more severely. Accounting for transparency implies that disclosure
adjusts the score across all three pillars of ESG. All else equal, a firm disclosing relatively
more than its peers should therefore receive a higher score. Thus, scores incorporate
performance and disclosure.
4.4 Sample construction
Our initial M&A sample contains deals where the target or acquirer has received an
ESG-score during the last 15 years. Further, we consider public targets, all countries in
the database, and deals since 2006. We only include deals where the acquirer initially
owns under 50% of the target, raising its stake to over 50% in the deal. This query yields
a total of 8 568 deals. We include private acquirers to maximize the sample size.
Minority stake purchases might be affected by regional differences in disclosure
requirements (Rossi & Volpin, 2004), potentially interacting with the disclosure component
of ESG scores. Thus, selecting only majority purchases removes this cross-border disclosure
bias.
We remove deals where the target identification code is missing (because adding financial
variables would be impossible). We also remove deals without data on the premium;
duplicate deals; financial acquirers14 per standard practice; firms with “government and
agencies” as their macro industry15; and deals where the target and acquirer is the same
firm (e.g., self-tenders). This sample contains 6 167 deals.
We use the ESG score from the announcement year16 since the score from subsequent years
might be influenced by efforts to look more ESG friendly to attract more attention from
prospective bidders, known as “Greenwashing” (Furlow, 2010). Additionally, acquiring
firms might also implement measures in their targets that affect ESG during and after the
14As defined by the SDC database.
15As defined by the SDC database. This category contains government entities.
16In the robustness section, we test whether the results from hypothesis 1 are robust to using the score
from the year before the announcement year.
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integration process. Regardless, we are interested in the score which reflects the target’s
focus on ESG factors when a deal is considered.
Matching the score to the deal announcement year leaves us with 892 deals. After adding
financial information, our sample consists of 762 deals. We will use the subsample where
acquirers also have a score in some models since this relationship is not well researched17.
The sample selection stages are summarized below, in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Sample Selection and Creation
Filter Number of Deals
Public target, all countries, announcement date from 01.01.2006,
from under 50% to over 50% ownership 8 568
Target identifier (44)
Deal premium (1287)
Remove duplicate deals (0)
Remove financial acquirers (1054)
Remove government and agencies (4)
Remove self-tenders (same target and acquirer) (11)
Remove deal without announcement date data (1)
Number of deals before adding ESG score 6167
ESG score in the announcement year (5275)
Remove deals without financial data (130)
Final sample size 762
Sample size when acquirers has score as well 475
Source: SDC & Refinitiv
We have included a breakdown of the number of deals by announcement year (Table 4.2)
and macro industry (Table 4.3). Most of the deals in our sample are recent: more than half
are from 2018 until today. The distribution is relatively even between target industries,
with financials, energy and power, industrials, and materials all having from 107 to 91
targets included in the sample. The financial industry is the most active for acquirers,
with 243, with the other industries having similar numbers of targets and acquirers.
17Of the articles reviewed, only Malik (2014) controls for acquirer performance. Her approach uses
CSR scores.
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Table 4.2: Deals by Announcement Year
Deal Announcement Year Number of Deals Percentage of Total Mean Premium
2006 11 1.44 20.08
2007 16 2.09 21.23
2008 10 1.31 22.98
2009 8 1.04 25.02
2010 8 1.04 34.01
2011 15 2.09 19.00
2012 24 3.13 28.69
2013 21 2.87 22.74
2014 47 6.14 28.59
2015 80 10.44 26.06
2016 76 9.92 27.23
2017 58 7.57 32.77
2018 95 12.40 26.28
2019 122 15.93 28.98
2020 171 22.58 30.92
Source: SDC. The mean premium for the entire sample of 766 deals is 28.12%.
Table 4.3: Deals by Macro Industry
Industry Number of Targets Number of Acquirers Mean Premium
Financials 107 243 19.65
Energy and Power 105 88 25.80
Industrials 91 73 25.56
Materials 90 73 30.01
High Technology 80 55 38.96
Media and Entertainment 56 44 31.50
Healthcare 50 42 39.99
Retail 43 35 26.45
Real Estate 40 26 17.21
Consumer Products and Services 36 33 29.57
Consumer Staples 33 26 30.49




This section will detail all variables used in our models. Furthermore, we will detail our
motivation for including the variable in question in light of previous research and economic
intuition. We start by examining our dependent variable, the deal premium, before
discussing the main explanatory variables, and lastly, the controls. We have included
tables with descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix (Table 5.1 and A2, respectively).
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Unit Mean Median Min Max Standard deviation
Premium Percent 28.12 26.07 -41.00 129.29 31.18
ESG-scores:
Target Number 40.95 38.71 2.07 92.51 19.25
Acquirer Number 53.14 55.79 7.28 94.18 20.68
Deal-specific variables:
Cross-border Dummy 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49
Multiple bidders Dummy 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.35
Blockhold Dummy 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.43
Cash payment Dummy 0.76 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.43
Share payment Dummy 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50
Industry Relatedness Dummy 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50
Deal value Million USD 7543.34 2395.79 8.76 95882.84 14529.35
Relative Deal Size Deal Value/Assets 1.21 0.68 0.00 40.74 2.22
Financial variables:
Market Capitalization Million USD 8390.36 2940.00 21.21 105472.23 15689.90
Market to Book MCap/Equity 4.26 1.75 0.12 135.30 13.51
Leverage Debt/Equity 1.72 0.61 0.00 119.36 7.94
Growth Percent 0.09 0.02 -0.82 7.79 0.61
Investment Rate CapEx/Assets 5.14 3.60 0.00 48.61 6.03
Analyst Following Dummy 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.47
Note: Based on 762 transactions. Premium is Winsorized at the 5% level, Financial variables are
Winsorized at the 1% level. Source: SDC and Refinitiv
5.1 Dependent Variable
The deal premium is gathered from the SDC database and measured four weeks before the
announcement date to eliminate the effect of any takeover rumors or insider trading. Jarell
& Poulsen (1989) show that takeover rumors impact price and lead to insider trading: The
share price reflected one-third of the premium before the bid announcement. However,
the time horizon must be limited to avoid accidentally including effects of fundamental
factors which impact the share price in the longer term. Thus, we follow Jory et al. (2016)
and Rossi & Volpin (2004) and use a premium calculated from the share price four weeks,
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28 days, before the announcement:
Deal Premium =
Acquisition Price Per Share
Share Pricet−28
− 1 (5.1)
The mean premium is 28.1%, with a standard deviation of 31.2%, comparable to many of
the articles reviewed18. We winsorize at the 5% and 95% levels to minimize the influence
of outliers. After winsorizing, the premium paid ranges from -41% to 129.3%.
5.2 Explanatory Variables
We use the score from the deal announcement year. A firm might achieve a high score if
they are only slightly better than their peers because of relative scoring, as discussed in
the previous section. Additionally, disclosure comprises a variable component of the score.
The mean score for targets is 40.9, while it is 53.1 for acquirers. Both have significant
variation, with values ranging from under 8 to over 92 points for both parties. The
standard deviation is close to 20% for both.
We also include the components of the ESG score since the total score includes a lot of
underlying data, which might affect premiums differently. Furthermore, using category
scores will shed light on value-affecting ESG initiatives, which we will explore in hypothesis
one.
5.3 Control Variables
Our control variables are financial, deal-specific, or market-specific (fixed effects). We
winsorize continuous variables at 1%. The variable names, definitions, and sources are
located in the appendix, in Table A3.




The optimal approach would be to examine a randomly assigned set of firms to estimate
the premium. However, our data set only contains firms who have received an ESG score
before the deal announcement. A non-random sample potentially introduces a selection
bias, as receiving a bid or an ESG score is non-random19. If there is a correlation between
the error terms of our regression and the selection equation (i.e., the likelihood equation
for sample inclusion), OLS estimates might be biased (Heckman, 1979). Firms self-select
into being acquirers, which is intuitive because the decision of bidding on another firm is
non-random. This mechanism makes it hard to obtain a truly randomized sample when
researching M&As, which has implications for causality.
Therefore, in addition to OLS, we employ a two-stage Heckman correction to test and
account for potential selection bias (Heckman, 1979). The first stage estimates the
likelihood of being included in the sample. The second stage incorporates the results from
the first stage through the inverse Mills ratio20, controlling for possible bias.
Furthermore, other sources of endogeneity may be present. ESG scores are related to
the level of ESG disclosure (Refinitv, 2021), so ESG disclosure may be correlated with
the level of voluntary financial disclosure, which we will discuss further in section 6.5.2.
Therefore, we examine whether OLS estimates may be biased by the omitted variable,
affecting informational asymmetry and thus the deal premium. We create consistent
estimates by using instrumental variable regression.
Lastly, we will mimic randomization by using matching to investigate whether firms
improve their score post-merger. Since this introduces two observations of the same firms
(pre and post-merger), we can employ a difference-in-differences approach. Using the
matched sample, we will then be better able to infer causality.
19Meaning that there is possible selection bias from receiving an ESG score, and self-selection bias
from acquirers choosing whether or not to bid on potential targets.
20The inverse Mills ratio becomes a control variable, accounting for bias in this manner.
22 6.2 Hypothesis 1
6.2 Hypothesis 1
To analyze the effect of ESG scores on premiums, we employ OLS regression. We first
model ESG scores and deal-specific variables; one of the two models controls for the
acquirer’s ESG score in addition. We then add financial variables and fixed effects to these
two specifications, yielding two more models. We do not include country-fixed effects as
these exhibit variance inflation factors over 10. Thus, our models can be described by the
equation below:
Deal Premiumi = a+ β1ESGi + β2DSi + β3Fi + αi + θt + εi (6.1)
ESG is the ESG score of the target; DS is a vector of deal-specific variables; F is a vector
of target financial characteristics; α is the industry fixed effects21, while θ is the time fixed
effects. Model two and four also control for the ESG score of the acquirer, as mentioned.
We check for heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity by using a Breusch-Pagan test and
VIF-test, respectively. We report the results in the appendix. We use robust standard
errors where applicable. None of the models exhibit problematic values, i.e., factors
nearing the broadly accepted cut-off level of 10 (Hair et al., 1995).
Since ESG score is a very aggregated measure of all applicable initiatives in a firm, category
scores might offer a clearer picture of which activities affect premia. When inspecting the
correlation between the combined ESG score and the three pillar scores (Table A6 in the
appendix), we find very high correlations. The correlations imply that our results would
be very comparable if we were to replace ESG with one of the pillar scores in the models.
As such, we focus on category scores, which are also less aggregated than pillar scores,
so the potential effect on premia is less ambiguous. We test this with the third model
specification22.
6.3 Hypothesis 2a and 2b
Interaction effects indicate that a third variable influences the relationship between an
independent and dependent variable (Cox, 1984). For our purposes, this would imply
21Based on the 14 macro-level industry classifications by the SDC database and the target’s industry.
22The third model specification controls for deal-specific variables, financial variables, and fixed effects.
6.4 Hypothesis 3 23
that the ESG score interacts with some other variable to affect deal premiums. Thus, the
coefficient of ESG score alone (i.e., in models without interactions) might capture some of
the interaction effects. This point makes introducing interaction terms in our research
beneficial, as it allows us to test our hypothesis.
To determine whether information asymmetry and share payments affect the ESG effect
on premia, we include interaction terms between the score and cross-border deals, deals
within the same industry, deals with highly followed targets, and deals involving share
payments, individually. We build on specification three from hypothesis one.
6.4 Hypothesis 3
To determine whether targets or acquirers improve their score post-merger, we use
propensity score matching to mimic randomization, which is advantageous for causal
inference. With this matched sample, we perform a difference-in-differences estimation
of the average treatment effect - the average increase in ESG score from before the
merger to after it. We use the most recent ESG score to measure the treatment effect, so
improvements made after the merger are reflected. We test whether acquirers improve
their score by merging with a higher-scored target and vice versa.
To measure the transfer of ESG capabilities, we start by calculating the differential in
ESG score between the target and acquirer. The rationale is that a higher differential
implies that the potential for the transfer of capabilities is more significant than for smaller
differentials. We must choose a differential large enough to capture the potential effect
while retaining enough observations of the treatment group to get robust results. Thus,
we choose a cut-off of 25 points. Summarized below are the means of variables when
segmenting by the treatment and control groups before and after merging.
6.4.1 Propensity Score Matching
Propensity score matching estimates the treatment effect by accounting for covariates
that predict receiving the treatment. Not using propensity score matching leaves possible
biases in our existing sample since differences in treatment outcome (increase in ESG
score) may be caused by factors predicting treatment rather than the treatment itself.
Propensity score matching ensures that covariates used for matching are balanced (i.e.,
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics - Premium and
Scores
Acquirers Targets
Group: Treatment Control Treatment Control
Pre-merger:
Premium 26.8 23.8 29.3 26.0
Score Differential 36.8 -15.0 40.0 2.08
Acquirer Score 22.4 51.2 68.7 43.3
Target Score 59.3 36.2 28.6 41.2
Post-merger:
Score Differential 23.6 -15.6 36.3 5.90
Acquirer Score 33.7 55.3 73.4 50.5
Target Score 57.3 39.7 37.0 44.6
Note: Mean values of variables of interest for the treatment and
control groups before and after merging.
the means are not statistically different post-matching) (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).
We first estimate the propensity score for each observation to construct the control group.
We include firm location, industry relatedness, relative deal size, target size, and target
market to book ratio as covariates. These may explain the increase in score from before
the merger to after it (the treatment effect). The primary purpose of the method is not to
predict selection into treatment as well as possible but to balance all covariates (Caliendo
& Kopeinig, 2008).
Next, we apply logit as our distance measure. Since our treatment is binary, the model
choice is not crucial for distance measurement (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). We use
nearest neighbor matching, meaning that observations closest in propensity score to
the treatment group are included in the control group. Following Rosenbaum & Rubin
(1983), we conduct t-tests to assess the matching quality. These tests show no significant
differences in means after matching. We have included the results in Table 6.2 below.
6.4.2 Difference-in-differences
Difference-in-differences allows us to mimic an experimental research design using the
matched sample, potentially increasing the robustness of our findings (Angrist & Pischke,
2008). Difference-in-differences mitigate selection bias, systematic bias, and the impact of
external factors (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983), which is particularly relevant in our study.
In addition to the assumptions in OLS, difference-in-differences assume parallel trends
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics - Covariates Before and After Matching
Acquirers Targets
Group: Treatment mean Control Mean T-statistic Treatment mean Control Mean T-statistic
Pre-matching: (No. obs.) 18 349 102 265
Industry Relatedness 0.500 0.587 0.704 0.490 0.619 2.217∗∗
Relative Deal Size 0.873 1.400 2.275∗∗ 2.06 1.11 -3.188∗∗∗
Size 6.988 9.337 0.870 7.719 9.799 1.292
Market to Book 2.71 4.27 2.030∗∗ 5.63 3.64 -1.349
Post-matching: (No. obs.) 18 43 102 102
Industry Relatedness 0.500 0.558 0.405 0.490 0.461 -0.419
Relative Deal Size 0.873 0.906 0.135 2.06 1.42 -1.899
Size 6.988 5.114 -0.673 7.719 6.450 -0.869
Market to Book 2.71 3.24 0.565 5.63 3.87 -1.038
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
between the treatment and control groups (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). Using propensity
score matching increases the likelihood of fulfilling this assumption since the covariates
are balanced after matching.
In addition to the treatment variable, we include a time dummy, signifying whether the
observation is pre or post-merger. Thus, we arrive at the following equation for our
difference-in-differences model:
ESG Improvement = β0 + β1T + β2S + β3(T · S) + α + θ + ε (6.2)
T is the time dummy, S is the treatment dummy, and T*S is the interaction between
the two, capturing the difference-in-differences estimator. To isolate the effect, we employ
entity (α) and time (θ) fixed effects. We cluster the standard errors by entity to account
for possible issues with autocorrelation. Clustering leaves the difference-in-differences
estimator (δ̂) - the average increase in ESG score from before the merger to after it.
6.5 Endogeneity Concerns
To address potential endogeneity concerns and test the robustness of our results, we use
two approaches – a Heckman correction for selection bias and an instrumental variable
approach for other types of endogeneity.
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6.5.1 Selection Bias
To some extent, firms choose to disclose the necessary amount of information to receive
an ESG score. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that when disclosure is voluntary,
firms with good ESG performance will be more inclined to disclose their actions than
those with worse performance (Hummel & Schlick, 2016). Firms can use disclosure to
signal good performance financially and in terms of ESG.
If scored firms are not a random subset of the population, OLS might yield inconsistent
estimates (Kai & Prabhala, 2007). Such bias results from non-random selection and is a
special case of omitted variable bias (Heckman, 1979).
Methodologically, the correction entails first estimating a probit model on the likelihood of
being scored at the deal announcement time before using these results in the second-stage
regression to correct for possible bias. We model the likelihood of being scored as a
function of location, industry related deals, and industry dummies. Including location
is inspired by the scoring methodology (Refinitiv, 2021), while the latter variables are
inspired by the implementation by Aktas et al. (2011). The probit equation is thus as
follows:
Scored = Industry Relatednessi + αi + τi + υi (6.3)
The likelihood of receiving a score depends on industry relatedness, industry fixed effects
(α), and region (τ). Variables in the probit model not included in the second stage OLS
are referred to as exclusion restrictions, Z. At least one of these should be statistically
significant for the correction to be valid (Puhani, 2000). Thus, region becomes our
exclusion restriction since it is not included in the second stage.
We obtain the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage and use this as an additional control
variable in the second stage regression. This yields coefficients that are corrected for the
likelihood of selection because including the inverse Mills ratio corresponds to including
the omitted variable (Kai & Prabhala, 2007). If the inverse Mills ratio is significant,
there exists a bias since receiving a score and premia are related. Thus, our second-stage
regression estimates the following:
Deal Premium = a+ β1ESGi + β2DSi + β3Fi + αi + θt + µλ̂i + ξi (6.4)
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ESG is the ESG score of the target; DS is a vector of deal-specific variables; F is a vector
of the target’s financial characteristics; α are industry-fixed effects; θ are time-fixed effects;
λ is the inverse Mills ratio. We use specification three from hypothesis one, adding the
inverse Mills ratio. We also perform the correction on the models from hypothesis two.
We implicitly assume that voluntary disclosure affects whether a firm receives a score and
the deal premium23 when correcting for possible bias. The first point seems intuitive -
that the scoring methodology requires some level of disclosure to score firms. The second
point holds if, e.g., more information from voluntary disclosure increases the accuracy of
valuations, impacting premia.
6.5.2 Other Sources of Endogeneity
We control for other sources of endogeneity, such as reverse causality bias or bias resulting
from other omitted variables. Using country-year and country-industry means of ESG
scores as instruments24, we estimate a two-stage instrumental variable regression on model
three from hypothesis one and the models from hypothesis two.
Scoring is, in part, determined by the voluntary disclosure level of firms (Refinitiv, 2021).
The level of ESG-relevant disclosure may be correlated with the level of voluntary financial
disclosure on the firm level25, affecting the degree to which potential bidders are informed.
The intuition is that since ESG-related disclosure is voluntary to some extent, firms who
disclose more are be more likely to exhibit similar behavior regarding financial disclosure.
For example, Kim et al. (2012) theoirze that firms with good CSR performance are more
transparent and reliable in financial reporting. Higher quality disclosure is related to a
lower cost of capital (Diamond & Verecchia, 1991; Botosan, 2006), potentially making the
target more attractive and raising premiums.
On the other hand, higher disclosure may reduce the risk of overvaluation. Thus, the
direction of the potential bias is ambiguous. If ESG correlates with the error term in
OLS, endogeneity may exist. Two criteria need to be met in order to create consistent
23Which means that there exists a bias if the error terms of the two stages are correlated (Heckman,
1979).
24Country-year and country-industry means are computed using the entire Refinitiv database.
25Voluntary disclosure refers to disclosure exceeding the minimum required by law.
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estimates: instrument relevance26 and exogeneity (Stock & Watson, 2012):
Relevance : Cor(Zi, ESGt) 6= 0
Exogeneity : Cor(Zi, µi) = 0
(6.5)
The rationale behind using average scores as an instrument is that the ESG performance
of a firm is influenced by the ESG performance of its industry peers in the same country
and the ESG performance of other firms in the country over time (Cheng et al., 2013).
Therefore, we follow Gomes & Marsat (2018) in our choice of instruments. The instruments
are then detached from the potential firm-specific levels of unobserved effects. Thus, we
expect the instruments to satisfy the exogeneity requirement. However, if the unobservables
are country- or industry-specific, our instruments may prove to be endogenous as well.
For example, suppose the level of voluntary financial disclosure or earnings quality varies
by country-industry or by country-year. In that case, these may be reflected in the
average ESG scores and endogenize our instruments. Therefore, we acknowledge that the
instruments are conditionally valid.
We remove observations where the country-year and country-industry pairs have only one
observation, as the average, in that case, would be the ESG score of the single firm. To
test for the relevance and exogeneity conditions, we conduct an F- and J-test, respectively.
The results of our first-stage F-tests are displayed in Table 6.3. All models have F-statistics
well above the widely accepted cut-off of 10 (Staiger & Stock, 1997), indicating that our
instruments are relevant and strong27.
Table 6.3: IV: F-Test
Model Hypothesis 1 Analyst Following Share Payment
F-statistic 32.79 22.69 22.08
The F-statistic has a cut-off of 10.
As we have more instruments than endogenous variables, our model is overidentified, and
we can conduct a J-test for exogeneity. The p-value reported from the overidentification
test is 0.74728, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are exogenous
26Instruments are denoted with Z. µiistheerrortermfromthegeneralOLSequation
27The first stage results are reported with the second stage results, in the results section.
28Tests for the other specifications yield similar results.
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under the assumption that at least one of the instruments is exogenous. Therefore, we
proceed with using these two instruments to estimate our IV models.
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7 Results
This section presents our findings and discuss them, drawing on the previous sections. We
start with the hypothesis one specifications, looking first at the aggregated ESG score,
before discussing the results when using category scores. Then, we discuss our findings
from hypothesis two a and two b. Lastly, we present our findings from hypothesis three.
7.1 Hypothesis 1
7.1.1 ESG-Scores
We have included the regression output in Table 7.1. Initially, we run four regressions as
described in the methodology section. Since model three shows a significant effect from
target ESG score on deal premiums, we focus on this specification.
In the third specification, the target ESG score is statistically significant at a 5% level. An
increase in ESG score of one standard deviation yields 2.9 percentage points more premium,
ceteris paribus. In practice, this would imply that a target with a market capitalization of
5.9 billion dollars (the approximate mean market capitalization the premium is calculated
from) would be paid an additional 169 million dollars if their score increased by one
standard deviation. Furthermore, compared to the mean sample premium of 28.1%, this
effect is substantial from the perspective of economic significance. Isolated, this result
suggests that ESG initiatives are valuable, consistent with the stakeholder view. However,
this assumes that an increase in score of one standard deviation costs less than the value
added in the transaction. Whether this is plausible or not is outside the scope of this
thesis. Regardless, the results support our original hypothesis.
We argue the point above because higher ESG scores might lead to better or more
ESG-related capabilities. These are intangible and ambiguous by nature, making them
challenging to value (Gomes & Marsat, 2018). An example of this is where a firm increases
its ESG performance, which might lead to better relationships with stakeholders (Godfrey
et al., 2009), potentially creating a competitive advantage. Further, high scores might
reflect strong ethics and organizational culture (Choi et al., 2015), e.g., increasing the
motivation of employees to the benefit of the firm in question. Evidently, the total effect
might result from multiple ambiguous, smaller effects, as theorized in the literature review.
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This vagueness motivates us to look closer at category scores.
We arrive at the same conclusion as most of the findings contained in our literature review.
For example, Gomes & Marsat (2018) found an increase in premium of 5.5 percentage
points, following an increase in target CSR score of one standard deviation. Since they
ignore the governance pillar, the difference in effect might be that governance impacts
premium negatively in our sample. However, this is not the case, as replacing the ESG
score with governance score in specification three yields a significantly positive effect29.
Thus, the difference might be attributable to the choice of control variables or the time
period. Focusing on the latter of the two, the difference may suggest that acquirers were
more willing to pay a premium for good ESG performance previously. This finding might
be due to fewer firms committing resources to ESG initiatives previously, making good
ESG performance more scarce than it is currently.
We also note that if good ESG performance reduces information asymmetries, it may
mitigate adverse selection and its associated risks. In this instance, acquirers will be more
certain about the actual quality of the target, consistent with the signalling argument by
Choi et al. (2015) and the findings of Cormier & Magnan (2014). This further implies that
high-quality targets could receive a higher premium, and vice versa for low-quality targets,
consistent with the lemons problem (Akerlof, 1978). High-quality targets are therefore
incentivized to increase disclosure and transparency, raising their potential payoff. Of
course, this would mean that valuations would become more accurate, implying that the
ESG effect on premia would be positive for higher-quality targets and negative for lower-
quality targets (Datar et al., 2001). This point also illustrates how the effect of reduced
information asymmetries may have an ambiguous effect on deal premia, warranting further
investigation in hypothesis 2.
The point above is related to the risk-mitigating effects of ESG as well. If reduced
asymmetric information lowers the risk of misvaluation (Malik, 2014), it lowers overall
risk as well. This implies that these effects are intertwined, but acquirers might be willing
to pay more for less risky targets, consistent with the findings discussed in the literature
review (Datar et al., 2001).
The target score is only significant in the third specification. When not controlling for
29Regressions with pillar scores are reported in the appendix, in Table A7
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financial variables, the effect vanishes. The same is true when controlling for acquirer
score in model 4. The first point indicates that the introduction of financial characteristics
increases the predictive validity of ESG scores. As such, when we control for financial and
deal-specific characteristics, some unexplained variation in premiums is explained by the
ESG score of the target. It should be reiterated that the sample is reduced to 475 deals
when including the acquirer score as well, which also might explain the insignificance.
The signs of our controls are mostly consistent with our expectations from the literature
review. Even though extant research has shown ambiguous effects on premiums from
most variables, our results are mostly consistent with intuition, the majority of scholars,
and the theory discussed earlier.
Unsurprisingly, multiple bidders yield a significantly positive effect on premia. Disregarding
“no applicable” deal attitudes30, this is the most considerable absolute effect on premia in
our findings, accounting for nearly one third to two thirds of the mean premium. Our
results more closely resemble those of Varaiya (1987), who finds an increase of 18.75%,
than Fidrmuc (2013), who finds a negative effect. Having a blockhold lowers premia,
consistent with extant research31. In hostile deals, the effect is positive - from 10.2 to 16.6
percentage points higher premiums - which we also expected. It seems that cash payments
lead to higher premiums, while the opposite is true for share payments. In the context of
the applicable theory and what the payment methods proxy for, this seems sensible.
Both of the size metrics impact premium significantly but with opposite effects. Given
the vast array of effects size might proxy for, this is perhaps not so surprising. We find a
significantly negative effect on premia from the investment rate, indicating that relatively
more investment is seen negatively by acquirers.
30We do not offer this result much attention as only 9 deals in the sample are classified as “No
applicable” deal attitude. There are only 5 “Neutral” deals, so the same is true for these.
31E.g. Dionne et. al (2015); Walkling & Edmister (1985).
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Table 7.1: Regression Analysis on Deal Premiums
Dependent variable:
Deal Premium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Target ESG 0.047 −0.002 0.149∗∗ 0.079
(0.056) (0.069) (0.073) (0.090)
Acquirer ESG 0.017 −0.020
(0.063) (0.072)
Cross-border 1.657 0.489 2.100 1.159
(2.224) (2.633) (2.403) (2.785)
Multiple Bidders 11.796∗∗∗ 12.910∗∗∗ 12.332∗∗∗ 15.529∗∗∗
(3.135) (3.530) (3.783) (4.085)
Blockhold −13.132∗∗∗ −12.443∗∗∗ −9.605∗∗∗ −9.925∗∗∗
(2.572) (3.342) (2.728) (3.505)
Hostile Deal 10.192∗ 13.263∗∗ 12.011∗ 16.600∗∗
(5.588) (6.452) (6.320) (7.751)
Neutral Deal −2.932 −8.589 −6.022 −17.997∗∗
(13.180) (19.052) (11.906) (7.331)
No Applicable Attitude −29.013∗∗∗ −33.309∗ −26.394∗∗∗ −28.922∗∗
(9.916) (18.914) (6.682) (11.757)
Unsolicited Deal −4.571 −3.752 −2.675 −2.507
(2.955) (3.677) (3.238) (4.032)
Cash Payment 14.159∗∗∗ 13.010∗∗∗ 12.366∗∗∗ 11.790∗∗∗
(3.228) (3.298) (3.331) (3.516)
Share Payment −6.808∗∗ −9.553∗∗∗ −4.883 −6.419∗
(2.857) (3.128) (3.184) (3.279)
Industry Relatedness −0.312 2.990 −0.790 1.638
(2.246) (2.528) (2.320) (2.468)










Investment Rate −0.529∗∗ −0.480∗
(0.252) (0.261)
Analyst Following −3.540 −3.653
(2.435) (2.726)
Constant 20.404∗∗∗ 23.244∗∗∗ 61.831∗∗ 47.702
(4.281) (5.326) (25.393) (29.014)
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 762 475 762 475
R2 0.139 0.178 0.212 0.275
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.157 0.165 0.201
Residual Std. Error 29.081 (df = 750) 26.470 (df = 462) 28.421 (df = 718) 25.776 (df = 430)
F Statistic 10.982∗∗∗ (df = 11; 750) 8.362∗∗∗ (df = 12; 462) 4.504∗∗∗ (df = 43; 718) 3.706∗∗∗ (df = 44; 430)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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7.1.2 Category Scores
Next, we re-run model three with the ten category scores instead of the aggregate ESG
score. We include the results in Table 7.2 below. The Table contains three categories:
resource use, human rights, and management, as these are the statistically significant
categories. Interestingly, this means that exactly one category from each pillar is significant,
which might allude to their relative importance compared to the insignificant ones. All
pillars are important if a firm wants its ESG performance to be valued. For all three
categories, the control variables remain largely similar.
Increasing the category score by one standard deviation would yield a premium of 3.1,
2.4, and 2.0 percentage points higher for resource use, human rights, and management,
respectively. A firm with a market capitalization of, e.g., 3 billion dollars, would receive
an additional 60 to 93 million dollars in a deal. Still, whether the gains exceed the costs of
raising the score is hard to determine because the relationship between score improvements
and costs is hard to observe.
The relationship between costs and management or governance structures32 is perhaps
even more complex than for the other categories. The reason is that the costs associated
with adhering to best-practice governance principles are not readily observable, making
the relationship between management score improvements and costs unobservable as well.
Our findings imply that acquirers value resource-efficient targets relatively more. Targets
with a strong performance in this category might have specific capabilities or advantages
which allow them to operate more efficiently. Such competitive advantages can, for
example, reduce costs, leading to realizable synergies consistent with the synergy hypothesis
discussed in section two. Thus, our findings support extant research in that good ESG
performance can enhance or create synergies (Deng et al., 2013; Aktas et al., 2011; Malik,
2014).
A firm increasing its category score by one standard deviation is equivalent to raising it
by 32-28 points. Since scoring is relative, this implies that, e.g., a firm with a score in
the second to lowest quartile (25-50) would increase their score up to the second-highest
or highest quartile (50-100). Intuitively, this seems very hard to accomplish in practice
32The management category score explicitly accounts for how well the firm adheres to best-practice
governance principles, which is why it is relevant in our discussion.
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but could perhaps be possible in an industry where the score of peers is poor. Another
interesting finding is that targets can receive higher premiums by increasing their resource
use score by one standard deviation than increasing their overall ESG score by one standard
deviation. We argue that these differences might be due to the relatively more tangible
characteristics of resource use which may act as a clearer signal to the acquirer, consistent
with Choi et al. (2015). Since increasing the overall score based on ten categories is much
more complicated than increasing one category, our findings suggest that targets are much
better off focusing on their resource use.
Further, drawing on the results from Chatterji et al. (2009), we find it likely that this
concern is applicable for category scores as well. Taking the human rights category as
an example, it seems to be the most qualitative of the three categories since it judges
adherence to human rights conventions. Intuitively, this seems very hard to measure, given
the complexity of, e.g., multinational corporations operating in many different regions and
that undesirable behavior is often hidden from the public’s view. For example, many firms
use factories in developing countries to save costs, where working conditions are harsh.
Such intricate relationships might be hard to detect for score providers, especially through
publicly available documentation. The previous point reinforces that the intangible nature
of ESG initiatives are hard to value (Gomes & Marsat, 2018).
To summarize, we find a significantly positive effect of ESG on premia. We argue that
the observed effect is economically significant since ESG capabilities potentially provide
value to the firm. We also note that whether these capabilities are truly valuable depends
on the costs of increasing ESG performance, a relationship that is hard to observe. The
same is true for the category scores discussed in the second part of the hypothesis. We
find that firms might be better off focusing on individual categories if they want their
efforts to be valued in an M&A. Our findings show that resource use, human rights, and
management are the most significant individual categories in terms of premia.
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Table 7.2: Regression Analysis Using ESG Category Scores
Dependent variable:
Deal Premium
Resource Use Human Rights Management
Category Score 0.099∗∗ 0.078∗ 0.072∗
(0.046) (0.043) (0.040)
Cross-border 1.600 1.658 2.338
(2.370) (2.361) (2.382)
Multiple Bidders 11.317∗∗∗ 12.125∗∗∗ 12.310∗∗∗
(3.735) (3.779) (3.797)
Blockhold −9.896∗∗∗ −9.755∗∗∗ −9.205∗∗∗
(2.754) (2.748) (2.739)
Hostile Deal 12.620∗∗ 12.461∗∗ 12.232∗
(6.252) (6.176) (6.365)
Neutral Deal −6.811 −5.680 −5.144
(12.299) (11.163) (12.154)
No Applicable Attitude −26.089∗∗∗ −27.816∗∗∗ −25.285∗∗∗
(6.987) (7.021) (7.048)
Unsolicited Deal −1.939 −2.169 −2.076
(3.222) (3.306) (3.234)
Cash Payment 12.066∗∗∗ 11.879∗∗∗ 12.372∗∗∗
(3.296) (3.303) (3.314)
Share Payment −5.537∗ −5.501∗ −4.676
(3.120) (3.118) (3.163)
Industry Relatedness −0.328 −0.565 −0.680
(2.295) (2.307) (2.323)
Relative Deal Size 3.167∗∗∗ 3.066∗∗∗ 3.099∗∗∗
(0.711) (0.699) (0.736)
Ln(Size) −2.151∗ −1.879∗ −1.613
(1.134) (1.085) (1.048)
Market to Book −0.237 −0.233 −0.222
(0.150) (0.146) (0.155)
Leverage 0.293 0.266 0.261
(0.239) (0.236) (0.244)
Growth 2.730 2.603 2.651
(1.913) (1.947) (1.944)
Investment Rate −0.545∗∗ −0.546∗∗ −0.560∗∗
(0.250) (0.251) (0.253)
Analyst Following −3.205 −3.047 −2.848
(2.407) (2.414) (2.406)
Constant 65.231∗∗ 62.306∗∗ 51.169∗∗
(26.051) (25.583) (24.472)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 760 760 762
R2 0.213 0.210 0.211
Adjusted R2 0.165 0.162 0.163
Residual Std. Error 28.258 (df = 716) 28.306 (df = 716) 28.455 (df = 718)
F Statistic 4.496∗∗∗ (df = 43; 716) 4.424∗∗∗ (df = 43; 716) 4.453∗∗∗ (df = 43; 718)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Our contextual proxies for asymmetric information yield mixed results, as shown in Table
7.3. The Table includes interaction terms for cross-border and industry-relatedness with
the ESG score of the target, respectively. Interestingly, in both, the ESG score on its
own is still statistically significant at the 5%-level, while the interaction terms are both
statistically insignificant. These results indicate that the effect of ESG on premia in
cross-border deals and deals within the same industry do not differ from other deals.
These findings contradicts hypothesis two a. One possible explanation may be that
acquirers conduct extensive due diligence and do not receive any marginal information
from ESG-related activities (Chen & Gavious, 2015). Moreover, if acquirers increase their
due diligence to offset the increased uncertainty, this might explain the lack of differential
effect in cross-border deals. The ambiguity in effect of cross-border deals33 may also
further explain the insignificant interaction with the ESG score.
On the other hand, the interaction between the ESG score of the target and the indicator
for being in the upper tertile of most analyst-followed companies is significant at a 5%
level. When the target has a high degree of analyst following, the effect of the target’s
ESG score on premia is on average 0.250 lower than for targets that do not have a high
analyst following. The effect of ESG on premia is 0.229, meaning that the effect of ESG
score on premia in deals with highly followed targets is substantially reduced. This result
means that, on average, ESG is less important in deals where there is relatively little
asymmetric information, which supports our hypothesis. One explanation may be that
as ESG engagements may act as signals (Choi et al., 2015). The effect of these signals
may be less critical when information asymmetries are already low. This result supports
extant literature claiming that the effect of ESG on premia is partly due to reductions in
information asymmetry.
Overall, we do not find evidence that the effect of ESG on premia is different in cross-
border and same-industry deals. We find, however, that the effect of the targets’ ESG
score seems to diminish in deals when the target has a high analyst following. Thus,
while we cannot ascertain a definite relationship between asymmetric information and
the ESG effect on premia through deal-specifics, we find some support for our hypothesis.
33As discussed in section 2.3.
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Therefore, we argue that part of the positive effect of ESG on premiums is due to reductions
in information asymmetries, at least insofar as using analyst following as a proxy for
asymmetric information.
Regarding hypothesis two b, Table 7.3 shows the specification when including an interaction
term between share payments and the target’s ESG score. The main effect of the target’s
ESG score, i.e., the effect when share payments are not used, is 0.255, significant at a 1%
level. Including an interaction term between share payments and the target’s ESG score,
we find that the interaction effect is -0.217, significant at the 10% level. This means that
the effect of the ESG score on premiums is diminished when the deal includes payment with
shares. This may be due to the diminutive effects of share payments on adverse selection
and risk (Hansen, 1987). It is intuitive that if some risk is already alleviated through
share payments, the marginal risk-reducing capabilities received through ESG-related
capabilities- and information as proposed by, e.g., Choi et al. (2015) and Godfrey et al.
(2009) may be of reduced importance. This finding supports the idea that ESG may be a
tool for risk-mitigation and that it as such partly drives the effect of ESG on premia.
On the other hand, the choice of share payments may signal the acquirer’s perceived risk
of the deal. This may also affect the due diligence process, where the acquirer performs
a higher degree of due diligence if the perceived risk is greater. Then, the importance
placed on ESG may be lower.
Ultimately, we find evidence in support of hypothesis two b. We therefore argue that
acquirers may value ESG as a tool for reducing risk and adverse selection, and that the
effect of ESG on premia may in part be driven by the risk-reducing elements of ESG.
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Table 7.3: Interactions with Target ESG Score
Dependent variable:
Deal Premium
Industry Relatedness Cross-border Analyst Following Share Payment
Target ESG 0.189∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.085) (0.086) (0.094)
Interaction -0.084 -0.111 -0.250∗∗ -0.217∗
(0.113) (0.121) (0.115) (0.117)
Cross-Border 2.173 7.010 2.562 2.428
(2.335) (5.567) (2.320) (2.402)
Multiple Bidders 12.256∗∗∗ 12.456∗∗∗ 12.140∗∗∗ 11.874∗∗∗
(3.687) (3.684) (3.676) (3.757)
Blockhold −9.641∗∗∗ −9.897∗∗∗ −9.765∗∗∗ −9.797∗∗∗
(2.645) (2.604) (2.640) (2.738)
Hostile Deal 12.120∗∗ 11.911∗∗ 11.388∗ 12.594∗∗
(5.900) (5.834) (5.817) (6.294)
Neutral Deal −6.178 −3.262 −5.902 −5.997
(9.446) (9.815) (9.507) (11.796)
No Applicable Attitude −26.344∗∗∗ −25.786∗∗∗ −25.732∗∗∗ −27.054∗∗∗
(5.680) (5.809) (5.972) (6.925)
Unsolicited Deal −2.488 −3.173 −2.047 −2.366
(3.128) (3.052) (3.123) (3.233)
Cash Payment 12.400∗∗∗ 12.465∗∗∗ 12.398∗∗∗ 12.747∗∗∗
(3.203) (3.252) (3.228) (3.325)
Share Payment −4.779 −5.262∗ −4.880 4.347
(3.065) (3.106) (3.096) (5.859)
Industry Relatedness 2.512 −0.358 −0.518 −0.626
(5.153) (2.228) (2.251) (2.306)
Relative Deal Size 3.217∗∗∗ 3.492∗∗∗ 3.187∗∗∗ 3.271∗∗∗
(0.658) (0.666) (0.645) (0.744)
Ln(Size) −2.083∗ −2.047∗ −2.137∗∗ −2.054∗
(1.083) (1.056) (1.073) (1.122)
Market-to-Book −0.242∗∗ −0.247∗∗ −0.233∗∗ −0.258
(0.120) (0.122) (0.117) (0.157)
Leverage 0.289 0.285 0.273 0.308
(0.198) (0.201) (0.195) (0.244)
Growth 3.007∗ 2.518 3.101∗ 2.562
(1.624) (1.694) (1.649) (1.929)
Investment Rate −0.539∗∗ −0.377∗ −0.523∗∗ −0.540∗∗
(0.237) (0.213) (0.234) (0.251)
Analyst Following −3.585 −3.306 7.997 −3.978
(2.373) (2.397) (5.603) (2.451)
Constant 59.472∗∗ 56.267∗∗ 59.048∗∗ 56.213∗∗
(24.708) (23.704) (24.255) (25.779)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 762 762 762 762
R2 0.213 0.204 0.217 0.216
Adjusted R2 0.165 0.168 0.169 0.168
Residual Std. Error 28.431 (df = 717) 28.379 (df = 728) 28.362 (df = 717) 28.369 (df = 717)
F Statistic 4.411∗∗∗ (df = 44; 717) 5.648∗∗∗ (df = 33; 728) 4.511∗∗∗ (df = 44; 717) 4.501∗∗∗ (df = 44; 717)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 7.4 shows the results from our matched sample difference-in-differences approach to
score increase. Both difference-in-differences estimators are statistically significant - at
10% and 1% for acquirer and target scores, respectively.
Our findings show that acquirers, on average, increase their score by 7.1 points by merging
with a target with a score 25 points higher or more. This finding supports our hypothesis
and indicates that the transfer of ESG capabilities between transaction parties is indeed
possible. Our findings are consistent with Berchicci et al. (2012), further implying that a
learning effect exists, as outlined by Aktas et al. (2011).
When looking at the targets’ improvement, this effect is slightly smaller, at approximately
5 points. Still, this indicates that the reverse of the case above is also true; that
targets can also learn from acquirers (Berchicci et al., 2012). Our findings indicate that
deal participants can increase their score significantly by transferring ESG capabilities,
suggesting that these are valuable.
Another point worth discussing is the difference in improvement between acquirers and
targets. Acquirers might pay specific attention to the ESG performance of their potential
targets because they are looking to enhance their performance when they consider
which targets to bid on (Berchicci et al., 2012). This argument holds if acquirers view
improvements as a way to create synergies, consistent with the synergy hypothesis. For
targets, the improvement might come as a side-effect of combining with the acquirer.
A score differential of one quartile implies that the firm with the lower score in the deal
has a greater probability of having a score below the average. If this is the case, one might
argue that improving a bad score by an arbitrary amount is more straightforward than
improving a good score by the same amount. This argument would weaken our conclusion
above regarding the significant transfer of ESG capabilities. However, since scoring is
based on peer performance, we do not consider this an issue in our study.
A point worth discussing is whether the observed score increase is economically significant.
The effect of a score increase is potentially insignificant in practice, but this is hard to
determine without knowing what costs these transfers entail. If these capabilities are easy
to transfer, an increase is potentially valuable. Additionally, higher ESG performance
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might create additional synergies relating to ESG capabilities, which are not captured in
the score34, potentially leading us to underestimate the true effect.
To summarize, we argue that our findings suggest that merging to transfer ESG capabilities
between the transaction parties might be seen as a different motive for M&A. At the very
least, we have shown that increasing the ESG performance is easier when learning from a
higher-scored counterparty, suggesting that the transfer of ESG capabilities is possible in
practice.
Table 7.4: Difference-in-differences Effect of Score
Increase
Ratio equals the number of control firms per treatment firm.
Matching with replacement indicates whether control firms can
be sampled by multiple treatment firms. NN means Nearest
Neighbor matching.
Dependent variable:
Acquirer ESG Target ESG
Increase in Score 7.114∗ 4.963∗∗∗
(4.087) (1.716)
Entity Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Ratio 3 1
Matching With Replacement Yes No
Matching Algorithm NN NN
Observations 122 408
R2 0.069 0.040
Adjusted R2 −0.909 −0.935
F Statistic 4.396∗∗ (df = 1; 59) 8.320∗∗∗ (df = 1; 202)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
34Consistent with Chatterji et al. (2009).
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8 Robustness
This section will investigate the robustness of our results. First, we will discuss endogeneity
and address possible issues related to omitted variable bias by using a Heckman correction
and instrumental variable regression. Then, we will use scores from the year before the
deal announcement and split the sample into two periods to test whether the main results,
from hypothesis one, are consistent.
8.1 Endogeneity
8.1.1 Heckman Correction
We employ the Heckman correction on the models from hypotheses one and two to account
for possible selection bias induced by the connection between premia, scores, and disclosure.
The results are in Table 8.1.
Our sample does not exhibit selection bias from scoring, determined by the insignificant
inverse Mills ratio. The target score from model three in hypothesis one is still significant
at 5%. The coefficient is slightly smaller, decreasing by 0.013. This difference suggests
that when adjusting for firms without scores, the effect of having a better score is smaller.
Again, given the insignificance of the inverse Mills ratio, we cannot determine if the
coefficients of score between hypothesis one and three are different. Because of this, we
will not discuss the control variables in great detail, but we do note that their coefficients
are broadly comparable to those of hypothesis one. In regards to the second hypothesis,
these coefficients are also broadly comparable, including the interactions themselves,
expect for analyst following. For this reason, along with the discussion above, we infer
that selection bias is not of concern in our study.
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Table 8.1: Heckman Correction
The first-stage probit model is computed using the




Hypothesis 1 Analyst Following Share Payments




Cross-border 2.038 1.969 2.348
(2.323) (2.322) (2.324)
Multiple Bidders 12.662∗∗∗ 12.579∗∗∗ 12.208∗∗∗
(3.254) (3.253) (3.256)
Blockhold −10.322∗∗∗ −10.423∗∗∗ −10.455∗∗∗
(2.764) (2.764) (2.759)
Hostile Deal 10.685∗ 10.560∗ 11.103∗
(5.862) (5.859) (5.853)
Neutral Deal −5.301 −4.549 −5.218
(13.822) (13.836) (13.792)
No Applicable Attitude −27.432∗∗∗ −27.011∗∗ −28.173∗∗∗
(10.554) (10.557) (10.539)
Unsolicited Deal −3.760 −3.649 −3.544
(3.101) (3.101) (3.096)
Cash Payment 12.318∗∗∗ 12.597∗∗∗ 12.706∗∗∗
(3.402) (3.413) (3.401)
Share Payment −5.073∗ −4.973 4.142
(3.030) (3.030) (5.803)
Industry Relatedness −0.662 −0.621 −0.463
(2.412) (2.409) (2.413)
Relative Deal Size 2.973∗∗∗ 2.980∗∗∗ 3.020∗∗∗
(0.558) (0.558) (0.557)
Ln(Size) −2.620∗∗∗ −2.627∗∗∗ −2.591∗∗∗
(0.834) (0.834) (0.833)
Market to Book −0.224∗∗ −0.228∗∗ −0.237∗∗
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Leverage 0.384∗ 0.386∗ 0.404∗
(0.215) (0.215) (0.215)
Growth 1.901 1.928∗ 1.610
(1.164) (1.164) (1.172)
Investment Rate −0.584∗∗∗ −0.591∗∗∗ −0.590∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.206) (0.205)
Analyst Following −2.236 2.613 −2.371
(2.500) (5.725) (2.495)
Constant 80.831∗∗∗ 78.572∗∗∗ 78.154∗∗∗
(28.225) (28.303) (28.218)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,163 6,163 6,163
ρ −0.183 −0.165 −0.224
Inverse Mills Ratio −5.422 (11.021) −4.887 (11.024) −6.698 (11.034)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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8.1.2 Instrumental Variable Regression
Table 8.2 shows the results from the IV regression. The models are estimated with the
same procedure and specification as the models in the first and second hypotheses, except
for country-year and country-industry averages as instruments for the targets’ ESG scores.
The estimates for hypothesis one are roughly similar to our OLS estimates - the ESG
score is, significantly positive at a 10% level. The same applies to hypotheses two a and
b - the ESG main effects are still significantly positive. The interaction between share
payments and the predicted values of ESG is also significant. These findings suggest that
our estimates do not suffer from endogeneity issues resulting from omitted variable bias
or simultaneous causality. However, for hypothesis two a, the interaction between the
predicted values of the ESG score and analyst following is not statistically significant.
Thus, our IV results are somewhat ambiguous as to whether endogeneity poses a problem.
For example, there may be a correlation with the level of voluntary financial disclosure
that may cause endogeneity. As discussed in the methodology section, the effect of the
potential bias is ambiguous.
In conclusion, we can not strictly rule out the possibility of endogeneity in the model
from hypothesis two a. Still, we reiterate that most of our models yield similar results as
our OLS models, which suggests that our model does not suffer greatly from endogeneity.
Of course, any inference from our IV regression results rests on the assumption that our
instruments are exogenous, as discussed in the methodology section. If this does not hold,
IV regression estimates may also be inconsistent.
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Table 8.2: Instrumental Variable Regression
Dependent variable:
Stage 1: Target ESG Stage 2: Deal Premium
Hypothesis 1 Analyst Following Share Payment Hypothesis 1 Analyst Following Share Payment
Country-industry 0.427∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗
(0.104) ) (0.119) (0.145)
Country-year 0.340∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.133) (0.139)




Cross-border 0.025 −0.017 0.058 1.426 2.500 3.362
(1.397) (1.399) (1.378) (2.928) (3.145) (3.027)
Multiple Bidders 0.243 0.135 −0.491 12.294∗∗∗ 11.379∗∗∗ 10.687∗∗∗
(1.809) (1.815) (1.905) (3.964) (3.998) (4.048)
Blockhold −2.280 −2.280 −2.240 −8.286∗∗ −8.193∗∗ −9.817∗∗
(1.756) (1.758) (1.630) (3.686) (3.712) (3.854)
Hostile Deal −0.797 −0.641 −0.654 7.643 6.371 8.989
(3.352) (3.359) (3.045) (7.562) (7.262) (7.323)
Neutral Deal 6.733 6.551 6.248∗ −7.968 −7.924 −6.750
(7.175) (7.186) (3.606) (10.397) (10.355) (10.686)
No Applicable Attitude −3.124 −2.964 −3.351 −28.561∗∗∗ −28.614∗∗∗ −36.828∗∗∗
(6.102) (6.117) (7.358) (6.699) (6.789) (8.591)
Unsolicited Deal 7.044∗∗∗ 7.219∗∗∗ 7.455∗∗∗ −5.086 −4.213 −3.752
(1.843) (1.856) (1.878) (4.317) (4.378) (4.296)
Cash Payment 0.998 0.962 0.838 11.220∗∗∗ 11.160∗∗∗ 13.960∗∗∗
(1.915) (1.918) (2.014) (3.983) (3.994) (3.906)
Share Payment 0.887 0.773 8.211 −5.221 −5.322 40.188∗∗∗
(1.711) (1.718) (8.009) (3.882) (3.908) (15.047)
Industry Relatedness −0.411 −0.415 −0.480 0.938 2.090 1.842
(1.378) (1.385) (1.352) (2.819) (3.013) (2.887)
Relative Deal Size −1.169∗∗∗ −1.182∗∗∗ −1.181∗∗∗ 2.974∗∗∗ 2.964∗∗∗ 2.854∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.363) (0.403) (0.910) (0.905) (0.903)
Ln(Size) 3.341∗∗∗ 3.332∗∗∗ 3.390∗∗∗ −3.906∗∗ −4.079∗∗∗ −2.928∗
(0.483) (0.484) (0.505) (1.528) (1.542) (1.518)
Market to Book 0.088 0.091 0.088 −0.091 −0.100 −0.098
(0.104) (0.104) (0.087) (0.183) (0.183) (0.191)
Leverage −0.079 −0.087 −0.066 0.277 0.271 0.326
(0.179) (0.179) (0.160) (0.389) (0.392) (0.424)
Growth −3.204∗∗∗ −3.149∗∗∗ −3.308∗∗∗ 4.254∗∗ 4.568∗∗ 1.855
(0.989) (0.991) (0.868) (1.943) (1.952) (2.132)
Investment Rate −0.185 −0.179 −0.177∗ −0.605∗∗ −0.588∗∗ −0.671∗∗
(0.113) (0.114) (0.097) (0.271) (0.271) (0.274)
Analyst Following 8.088∗∗∗ 10.310 7.679∗∗∗ −9.458∗∗ 15.574 −10.395∗∗∗
(1.662) (7.685) (1.600) (3.865) (21.670) (3.914)
Interaction with Country-Year −0.213 −0.482∗
(0.238) (0.248)
Interaction with Country-Industry 0.154 0.292
(0.195) (0.196)
Constant −66.529∗∗∗ −68.673∗∗∗ −70.161∗∗∗ 105.983∗∗∗ 105.444∗∗∗ 68.692∗∗
(13.581) (13.821) (12.424) (34.513) (34.925) (34.906)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 571 571 571 571 571 571
R2 0.439 0.440 0.445 0.187 0.183 0.162
Adjusted R2 0.393 0.391 0.396 0.120 0.115 0.092
Residual Std. Error 14.655 (df = 526) 14.671 (df = 524) 14.614 (df = 524) 30.149 (df = 527) 30.239 (df = 526) 30.629 (df = 526)
F Statistic 9.373∗∗∗ (df = 44; 526) 8.966∗∗∗ (df = 46; 524) 9.124∗∗∗ (df = 46; 524)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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8.1.3 Other Robustness Tests
We also perform OLS regression using scores from the year before the deal announcement
and split our sample into two periods - deals up to and including 2017 and from 2018
until 2020. We perform these robustness tests on model three from the first hypothesis.
The results are shown in Table 8.3 below.
Our findings are robust to splitting the sample into two approximately equal sizes based
on when the deal was announced. The coefficients of the ESG score and the controls are
comparable to those of hypothesis one, indicating that our findings have a satisfactory
level of robustness. The coefficient of the target’s score is slightly higher in recent deals,
but both coefficients are still reasonably close to our original estimate using the entire
sample.
However, our results are not robust to using the score from the year before the deal
announcement. The coefficient is notably smaller and insignificant, indicating that scores
from the year before are not drivers of the deal premium. The sample has around 100
fewer deals than the original, which is attributable to lower coverage previously. We note
that this robustness test does not capture score improvements made just before the deal,
which is unfavorable.
Our impression is not that this finding alludes to “greenwashing”35 by target firms since
a firm would need to improve their ESG performance and have the improvement be
reflected in their score before the deal announcement. In this case, the performance
improvement and subsequent score increase would have to be carried out from the initial
bid and reflected by the time the deal is announced if greenwashing occurs. Because of
this, greenwashing seems unrealistic in practice.
Thus, we conclude that our findings are mostly robust, increasing our confidence in our
results. Apart from analyst following, the endogeneity robustness tests yield largely the
same results as our OLS models. Therefore, we acknowledge the possibility that there
may be endogeneity in that specific model but emphasize that the other IV regression
robustness tests yielded similar results as our OLS models. We also find the robustness
test using the prior year’s score to be relatively less relevant, leading to this conclusion.
35As discussed in section 4.4.
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Table 8.3: Robustness Test on Results from Hypothesis 1
Dependent variable:
Deal Premium
Deals after 2017 Deals before 2018 Previous Year’s Score
Target ESG 0.192∗ 0.152∗ 0.101
(0.098) (0.086) (0.083)
Cross-border −3.180 5.138∗ 2.098
(3.413) (2.930) (2.539)
Multiple Bidders 14.426∗∗∗ 9.761∗∗ 11.937∗∗∗
(4.883) (3.984) (4.013)
Blockhold −10.285∗∗∗ −9.573∗∗∗ −9.658∗∗∗
(3.824) (3.558) (2.909)
Hostile Deal −2.971 19.822∗∗∗ 8.474
(10.410) (6.514) (6.326)
Neutral Deal −3.569 −5.843 −2.233
(17.658) (19.316) (13.240)
No Applicable Attitude −31.100∗ −23.259∗∗ −16.210∗∗∗
(17.747) (11.476) (5.494)
Unsolicited Deal −0.302 −5.139 −0.959
(4.503) (4.051) (3.469)
Cash Payment 9.897∗∗ 14.769∗∗∗ 13.304∗∗∗
(4.903) (4.314) (3.708)
Share Payment −10.194∗∗ −1.091 −4.958
(4.399) (3.797) (3.481)
Industry Relatedness −1.206 0.324 −2.199
(3.430) (3.014) (2.411)
Relative Deal Size 1.694 3.012∗∗∗ 3.228∗∗∗
(1.129) (0.915) (0.781)
Ln(Size) −2.249∗ −1.906∗ −1.190
(1.202) (1.133) (1.057)
Market to Book 0.342 −0.334∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗
(0.373) (0.128) (0.136)
Leverage −0.121 0.312 0.150
(0.544) (0.208) (0.191)
Growth 3.173 3.553 5.277∗
(2.120) (4.033) (2.997)
Investment Rate −1.026∗∗∗ 0.337 −0.619∗∗
(0.266) (0.268) (0.285)
Analyst Following −4.856 −2.546 −4.094
(4.268) (3.335) (2.538)
Constant 75.461∗∗∗ 47.368∗∗ 47.239∗∗
(26.411) (23.252) (23.770)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 386 376 666
R2 0.261 0.216 0.216
Adjusted R2 0.196 0.176 0.162
Residual Std. Error 29.076 (df = 354) 26.946 (df = 357) 27.736 (df = 622)
F Statistic 4.032∗∗∗ (df = 31; 354) 5.449∗∗∗ (df = 18; 357) 3.989∗∗∗ (df = 43; 622)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
48
9 Limitations of Research
To better nuance our contribution, we will address some of the main limitations of our
research and approach. Based on these limitations, we outline avenues for future research,
which can provide increased context, support, or rejection of our results.
Relative scoring implies that firms who are only slightly better than average (especially if
the distribution of firms has a low variance) might receive a higher score than comparable
firms. This point might skew our results since a component of the score is industry or
country-dependent. We also reiterate that scoring a firm based on ESG initiatives might
not necessarily capture the actual ESG performance of the firm in question. Thus, if we
were able to observe the actual performance, our results may have been different. However,
we view these ESG scores as the most applicable measure of such performance currently
available.
We find the lack of convergence and consistency across the major providers to be
unfortunate. Thus, we acknowledge the possibility that our results are mainly relevant to
the Refinitv ESG scores. Testing our models on data from other providers is difficult as
the coverage differs significantly between providers. Differences in coverage would imply
that the sample would be different, so we could not provide a definitive conclusion.
Researching M&As is complex due to the inherent self-selection mechanisms present in
every transaction. For targets, the probability of receiving a bid and a score is also non-
random. We have tried to correct for the latter using the Heckman correction. If specific
characteristics increase the likelihood of receiving a bid as well as the deal premium, this
might also create selection bias. Ultimately, this makes random sampling unrealistic in
practice, especially in our context, because of the limited coverage of ESG scores. Further,
we do not fully reject endogeneity through our IV regression models. These factors make
it harder to establish causal relationships.
9.1 Avenues for Future Research
Given the relatively small sample of deals in our approach, confined by the ESG-score
coverage, repeating this analysis when coverage is even better would be interesting. It
can hopefully provide additional robustness to our findings. The Corporate Sustainability
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Reporting Directive (CSRD) introduced by the EU in April 2021 might facilitate such
analysis. It increases the scale of mandatory ESG reporting for large and listed firms
operating in the EU36. Furthermore, if scoring becomes more standardized in the future,
leading to greater convergence between score providers, analyses such as this one would
carry more weight if scores from multiple providers were used. The CSRD initiative may
potentially alleviate this issue as well. It would also be interesting to see how absolute
scores (i.e., not adjusted for industry, country, or peer performance) would impact the
results.
Since a potential proxy of ESG is firm culture and ethics, an interesting avenue to explore
would be the integration success rate and post-acquisition performance in the context of
ESG. Our study focuses on the deal itself, so the proposed approach would be an excellent
complement to our findings. We have also mentioned that the costs of improving ESG
performance are hard to observe, making research into this area particularly interesting.
An area that has not been the focus in our work is whether the deal would have happened
if the target did not have an ESG score. Consistent with the risk of adverse selection,
deals may be abandoned if information asymmetries are too high. Transparency regarding
ESG initiatives might alleviate some of these asymmetries - increasing the chance of a
deal taking place and reducing the risk of mispricing.
36The CSRD would increase the number of firms disclosing ESG information in the EU from 11 000 to
50 000, which is why we cite this as an exciting development in the context of our research.
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10 Conclusion
Through our study, we have explored the effects of ESG score on M&A deal premia. We
have identified a positive relationship between ESG performance and premiums, consistent
with extant literature. To broaden our discussion and provide new insights on the topic,
we looked closer at the specific aspects of ESG and the mechanisms which enhance or
diminish the ESG effect on premiums.
We find that resource use, human rights, and management are the material contributors
to the positive relationship and suggest that targets are better off focusing on these
if they want to maximize the ESG-premium. We argue that these are relatively more
important since resource use is more quantitative and transferable to synergy gains such
as cost-reduction. Human rights help mitigate social scandal risks, and management is a
valuable resource and can impose better governance mechanisms.
In our second hypothesis, we focus our discussion on why ESG might impact premiums.
We find some evidence that the impact of the ESG score on premiums diminishes in deals
where the information asymmetry is relatively low and deals where share payments have
been used as a risk-sharing measure. We therefore argue that the positive effect of ESG
on premia is partly due to these factors.
Our third hypothesis investigates whether synergies are created from the transfer of ESG
capabilities. We find that when a firm merges with another with at least one quartile higher
score, they increase their score by a substantial amount. Our difference-in-differences
approach shows that acquirers increase their score by over seven points, while targets
increase theirs by almost five points, suggesting that the transfer of ESG capabilities is
possible. We also argue that this might therefore be a separate, contributing motive for
M&A.
Overall, we establish a positive relationship between the ESG score of the target and the
acquisition premium. Our findings also indicate that information asymmetries and risk
mitigation are important drivers for this effect. Furthermore, we establish a relationship
between entering into an M&A and score improvements, which we attribute to the transfer
of ESG capabilities, relating to synergies. Our findings implicate that ESG capabilities are
valuable and that firms may increase their sales value by improving their ESG performance.
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We hope this work can shed light on why ESG impacts premiums and the specific aspects
of ESG that are more relevant in determining the ESG premium - something which has
not been offered much attention in extant work.
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Table A1: Variable Proxies and Expected Sign






Information asymmetries, cultural gains,
governance +/-
Multiple Bidders Information cost +
Blockhold Information asymmetries, signal effect -
Hostile Attitude Use of antitakeover defenses +
Neutral, No Applicable, Unsolicited Deal NA ?
Cash Payment Chance of successful integration +
Share Payment Risk-sharing +/-
Industry Relatedness
Information asymmetries, antitrust risk,
economies of scope and scale +/-
Financial Variables:
Size & Relative Deal Size Synergy hypothesis, increased complexity +/-
Market to Book Growth potential, misvaluation
Leverage Signalling by debtors, managerial entrenchment -
Growth Market for corporate control, poor performance -
Investment Rate Synergy hypothesis ?
Analyst Following Information Asymmetries +/-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3: Variables Names and Definitions
Variables based on industries use the SDC industry classifications, which are based on SIC codes.
Variable Name Definition Source
Deal-specific Variables:
Cross-border 1 if the deal is international SDC
Multiple Bidders 1 if there are multiple bidders SDC
Blockhold
1 if acquirer has a stake of 5% or more in the target,
prior to announcement SDC
Deal Attitude
Factor variable capturing the recommendation of the
board or management SDC
Cash Payment 1 if cash is used to finance the deal SDC
Share Payment 1 if shares are used to finance the deal SDC
Industry Relatedness 1 if the transaction parties are in related industries SDC
Relative Deal Size Deal value divided by total assets SDC and Refinitiv
Financial Variables:
Size Natural logarithm of target’s market capitalization Refinitiv
Market to Book Market capitalization divided by book value of equity Refinitiv
Leverage Book value of debt divided by book value of equity Refinitiv
Growth Growth in revenue the year prior to the announcement Refinitiv
Investment Rate Capital expenditures divided by total assets Refinitiv
Analyst Following 1 if target is highly-followed (10 or more analysts) Refinitiv
Fixed Effects:
Industry Fixed Effects Macro-industry dummies SDC
Time Fixed Effects Year dummies SDC
Table A4: Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity
Model 1 2 3 4
Statistic 9.9767 7.5225 86.2665 74.6212
Parameter 11 12 43 44
P-value 0.5325 0.8212 0.0001 0.0027
Note: A p-value of < 5% indicates heteroskedasticity
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Table A5: VIF Test for Multicollinearity
Model 1 2 3 4
Target ESG 1.0445 1.1828 1.5112 1.6706
Acquirer ESG 1.1645 1.4406
Cross-border 1.0637 1.1372 1.1323 1.2787
Multiple Bidders 1.0776 1.0987 1.1430 1.2098
Blockhold 1.1159 1.0708 1.2513 1.2154
Deal Attitude 1.1336 1.1865 1.6639 2.0701
Cash Payment 1.7327 1.5871 1.8947 1.7951
Share Payment 1.8168 1.6119 1.9851 1.8273
Industry Relatedness 1.1322 1.0629 1.2303 1.2408
Relative Deal Size 1.7179 2.3423
Ln(Target Size) 1.7280 1.9537
Market to Book 2.8174 4.0303
Leverage 2.4870 3.0771
Growth 1.1623 1.2796
Investment Rate 1.3995 1.4674
Analyst Following 1.5564 1.6424
Industry Dummies 3.3493 5.2408
Year Dummies 2.8125 4.0004
Note: Values > 10 indicate multicollinearity
Table A6: Correlation Matrix for Total ESG and Pillar Scores
Target ESG Target E Target S Target G Acquirer ESG Acquirer E Acquirer S Acquirer G
Target ESG 1.00
Target E 0.84*** 1.00
Target S 0.88*** 0.71*** 1.00
Target G 0.68*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 1.00
Acquirer ESG 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.27*** 0.16*** 1.00
Acquirer E 0.30*** 0.42*** 0.27*** 0.14*** 0.87*** 1.00
Acquirer S 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.11** 0.91*** 0.77*** 1.00
Acquirer G 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.09* 0.15*** 0.68*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 1.00
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Pillar Score 0.096∗ 0.112∗ 0.101∗∗
(0.053) (0.061) (0.051)
Cross-border 1.644 1.733 2.341
(2.388) (2.366) (2.377)
Multiple Bidders 11.681∗∗∗ 11.436∗∗∗ 12.205∗∗∗
(3.773) (3.756) (3.789)
Blockhold −10.024∗∗∗ −9.621∗∗∗ −9.200∗∗∗
(2.771) (2.726) (2.733)
Hostile Deal 12.281∗ 12.370∗∗ 12.001∗
(6.327) (6.258) (6.338)
Neutral Deal −6.425 −5.186 −4.959
(11.971) (11.384) (12.224)
No Applicable Attitude −26.997∗∗∗ −27.712∗∗∗ −24.919∗∗∗
(7.003) (6.802) (6.993)
Unsolicited Deal −2.136 −2.208 −2.298
(3.217) (3.287) (3.223)
Cash Payment 11.910∗∗∗ 11.777∗∗∗ 12.439∗∗∗
(3.305) (3.306) (3.311)
Share Payment −5.584∗ −5.557∗ −4.698
(3.128) (3.128) (3.161)
Industry Relatedness −0.537 −0.344 −0.743
(2.299) (2.301) (2.322)
Relative Deal Size 3.115∗∗∗ 3.021∗∗∗ 3.138∗∗∗
(0.709) (0.686) (0.741)
Ln(Size) −2.082∗ −2.009∗ −1.684
(1.136) (1.101) (1.055)
Market to Book −0.234 −0.237 −0.227
(0.152) (0.149) (0.154)
Leverage 0.293 0.281 0.268
(0.242) (0.239) (0.243)
Growth 2.729 2.788 2.742
(1.927) (1.933) (1.956)
Investment Rate −0.549∗∗ −0.561∗∗ −0.558∗∗
(0.252) (0.251) (0.253)
Analyst Following −3.016 −3.116 −3.075
(2.410) (2.392) (2.410)
Constant 65.171∗∗ 61.922∗∗ 51.553∗∗
(26.326) (25.356) (24.423)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 760 760 762
R2 0.210 0.210 0.211
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.163 0.164
Residual Std. Error 28.301 (df = 716) 28.304 (df = 716) 28.446 (df = 718)
F Statistic 4.432∗∗∗ (df = 43; 716) 4.427∗∗∗ (df = 43; 716) 4.468∗∗∗ (df = 43; 718)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
These models are equivalent to model 3 in Hypothesis 1, but use the pillar scores instead of the total ESG score.
